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Biometric Surveillance in Schools:  Cause for concern or 
case for curriculum? 
Tom Bryce, Mike Nellis, Amanda Corrigan, Hugh Gallagher, Peter 
Lee and Howard Sercombe 
University of Strathclyde 
ABSTRACT 
This article critically examines the draft consultation paper issued by the Scottish 
Government to local authorities on the use of biometric technologies in schools in 
September 2008 (see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/09/08135019/0).
Coming at a time when a number of schools are considering using biometric systems to 
register and confirm the identity of pupils in a number of settings (cashless catering 
systems, automated registration of pupils’ arrival in school and school library 
automation), this guidance is undoubtedly welcome. The present focus seems to be on 
using fingerprints, but as the guidance acknowledges, the debate in future may 
encompass iris prints, voice prints and facial recognition systems, which are already in 
use in non-educational settings. The article notes broader developments in school 
surveillance in Scotland and in the rest of the UK and argues that serious attention must 
be given to the educational considerations which arise. Schools must prepare pupils for 
life in the newly emergent  ‘surveillance society’, not by uncritically habituating them to 
the surveillance systems installed in their schools, but by critically engaging them in 
thought about the way surveillance technologies work in the wider world, the various 
rationales given to them, and the implications  - in terms of privacy, safety and inclusion 
- of being a ‘surveilled subject’.     
INTRODUCTION
What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a 
calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour.  The human 
body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and 
rearranges it.  A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was 
being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies, not only so 
that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, 
with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines.  Thus 
discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, ‘docile’ bodies (Foucault 
1978: 138). 
The Report on The Surveillance Society, published in England by the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in 2006, contains a number of 
speculative vignettes describing how surveillance might impact on various areas 
of social life - transport, shopping, workplaces, criminal justice, etc., - by 2017. 
Schooling is alluded to, but not developed as well as the other areas. The
4following vignette (a concise means of concretising certain social possibilities, 
written for the purposes of this article) specifically addresses schooling and 
extrapolates from contemporary developments in surveillance technology, 
particularly those incorporating biometrics (fingerprinting, iris patterns, etc…).  It 
complements the vignettes in the Information Commissioner’s report (ICO 2006) 
and sets the scene for the issues which are analysed in this article.  
Keeping Track of Caitlin: Schools and Surveillance - a scenario for 2017    
It is not inconceivable that in the near future a secondary school pupil 
somewhere in the UK – let’s call her Caitlin, aged 16  - might register their 
arrival at school by passing a radio frequency identification (RFID) chipped card 
across a scanner at the entrance to the main building, having already been 
filmed by CCTV cameras coming though the school gate. An autotext is sent to 
her mother’s mobile phone, letting her know Caitlin has arrived. Internal CCTV 
cameras follow her down the main corridor - images are recorded digitally for 
security purposes; no one is actually watching in ‘real-time’. She arrives at her 
first class, where she hands in written work on a CD, to be scanned by 
plagiarism software. Later in the morning she takes two books out of the library, 
using a fingerprint scanner installed several years before the RFID registration 
system was introduced (otherwise the same card could be used in the library). 
Unknown to her, or to any pupil, the senior school administrator takes five 
minutes to do an ‘online headcount’ just before lunch - the position of every 
chipped identity card on site (and the person assumed to be carrying it) is 
graphically displayed on a screen in his office, colour-coded to show if any pupil 
is not in the classroom they are supposed to be in at that time of the day. All 
seems well, but the movement sensors installed in the school lavatories - so 
much less intrusive than webcams - indicate that two pupils have remained 
there for longer than might be considered necessary.  
At 1pm Caitlin does use her RFID card on the canteen scanner to debit her 
lunch account. In the afternoon she travels to a further education college, 
entering the premises using a fingerprint registration system because the 
college has not yet upgraded to an RFID system, despite being twinned with her 
school. She logs on to her college computer using the same fingerprint scanning 
system, grateful that she does not have to remember a password, as (she has 
been told) pupils did in the old days.  Between classes she is invited to join a 
cluster of pupils as they walk through a police-manned  ‘search arch’, recently 
installed in the college to deter knife-carrying after a ‘serious incident’ outside 
the college gates.  At the end of the school day she leaves the building, de-
registering her presence there using the fingerprint scanner. 
At home, fifteen minutes later, Caitlin’s mother goes online to check her 
daughter’s whereabouts by locating her GPS-enabled mobile phone, using the 
latest ‘kidtracka’ software.  She assures herself that her daughter is on the way 
home, glad that she does not have to raise her daughter’s anxiety by actually 
phoning her. She wishes that the college had an autotext system which notified 
her phone when Caitlin ‘clocked-out’, just as the school’s registration system did 
when she ‘clocked-in’ in the morning. She still worried that Caitlin would lose her 
RFID card, and preferred the scanning system at her younger son’s primary 
school, where the RFID chip was sensibly sewn into the lapel of his blazer, un-
losable. She remembers that she has a letter from the school, inviting her to a 
PTA meeting to discuss the implications of their latest privacy impact 
assessment, but she knows she will be too busy to go. She is confident that 
5there will be no problems with it, and that the minority of parents who always 
seem to criticise the safeguarding systems will not get their way. She is happy 
that in an uncertain world her children are so well looked after by their schools. 
When one reflects carefully on what is already happening in Britain in respect of 
surveillance, as the ICO has done, this is not as implausible a scenario for a 
decade hence (or less) as it may at first seem, for some if not for all schools. 
Whilst anecdotes abound in the press, however, little systematic knowledge has 
been gathered about surveillance in schools in Britain (or indeed, worldwide1).
Andrew Hope’s work on CCTV in British schools makes a start (see Hope 
2009), and a recent collection by Monahan & Torres (2009) significantly 
illuminates developments in North America. By way of creating a context for our 
own observations, we will nonetheless begin with the anecdotes. The examples 
below are drawn from a random trawl of newspapers, TV news reports and 
internet news sites since 2000, with all the methodological limitations that this 
implies. They relate more to England than Scotland. They may well be merely 
transient-but-newsworthy incidents, or early signs of imminent, ongoing or as 
yet inchoate trends: no-one knows. While they do not in themselves, even in 
aggregate, indicate the prevalence or depth of surveillance in British schools, 
they do suggest that closer attention be given to the issue than it has received 
to date. Our scrutiny of press coverage has of course been influenced by the 
ICO report itself, for it provides, if not a framework for surveillance-related 
issues in contemporary society, then a wide range of headings under which fall 
topics of prospective interest to researchers in this field. Together with matters 
raised in the Scottish Government Consultation Paper (discussed in detail in the 
section following this), we used these headings to identify where journalists 
were noting matters of public concern regarding surveillance. 
SIGNS OF SURVEILLANCE IN BRITISH SCHOOLS  
In public discourse “surveillance” remains a word with mostly sinister 
connotations, evoking Orwell’s Big Brother and the spectre of insidious 
totalitarian controls, but in recent years attempts have been made by academics 
to define it more neutrally, so as to better understand the multiplicity of data 
gathering practices in contemporary global society, the range of reasons given 
for their use and the diversity of their consequences, hidden and overt, intended 
and unintended, good and bad, or both. David Lyon’s widely accepted definition 
will be used here:  
[Surveillance] is the focussed, systematic and routine attention to personal 
details, for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction. 
Surveillance in the end directs its attention to individuals (even though 
aggregate data, such as those available in the public domain, may be used to 
build up a background picture). …. This attention to personal details is not 
random, occasional or spontaneous: it is deliberate and depends on certain 
1
 International developments are beyond the scope of this paper but Nellis et al. (2008) refer to 
instances of school surveillance in the USA, Japan and Sweden. The use of electronic “tagging” 
technology for truancy reduction in the USA is discussed in Michel (2009).   
6protocols and techniques. …..  it occurs as a “normal’ part of everyday life in all 
societies that depend on bureaucratic administration and some kinds of 
information technology. Everyday surveillance is endemic to modern societies 
(Lyon 2007: 14).           
In terms of this definition, which encompasses watching, monitoring movement 
and the routinised authentication of identities, all of the following are examples 
of surveillance used in, or in relation to, schools. They are not exclusive or 
exhaustive, but putative instances of the ways in which children in contemporary 
society are being subject to surveillance for both welfare and control reasons  
(Fotel & Thomsen 2004; Penna & Kirby 2009).  They signify, between them, a 
newly emergent reality which warrants deeper and more detailed analysis. 
Visual Surveillance 
CCTV is in widespread use in schools in Britain, for a range of different 
purposes – the prevention of vandalism, the monitoring of access at the school 
perimeter, the maintenance of order in classrooms and corridors and as a 
means of protecting school staff from allegations of mistreating pupils (Scotland
on Sunday, 12th October 2008). Tragedies like the Dunblane murders in 1996 
gave easy legitimacy to some uses of CCTV, but other uses, such as their use 
in toilets to combat vandalism, smoking and drug-taking, have occasionally 
antagonized parents – although the school concerned still sought to defend the 
practice (The Guardian, September 17th 2005). In some nurseries and pre-
schools, internet-linked webcams enable parents to ‘look in on’ their child at 
various points during the day. The National Day Nurseries Association is 
opposed to them on both privacy and security grounds, as well as fearing that 
staff–child interaction will be disrupted. The Professional Association of Nursery 
Nurses sees it as unwarranted ‘workplace surveillance’ rather than a means of 
enhancing childcare; in reality it may function as both simultaneously.  
Electronic Registration 
Increasing numbers of schools use electronic registration to improve efficiency, 
security, and child protection (automatically notifying parents by phone or text of 
their child’s safe arrival in school) - and to reduce truancy (Lewis 2004).  Some 
use fingerprint scanners - twice daily pupils scan themselves in as they pass 
various sensors, and their presence is immediately recorded on a computer 
(Hammersley 2004). Trutex, a long-established English school uniform maker, 
has expressed interest in using tracking technology, linked to a tiny signaling 
device embedded in school clothing (The Guardian, 21st August 2007), and 
Hungerhill High School in Doncaster began testing RFID tracking equipment 
with 19 pupils, using “smart threads” embroidered into uniform jumpers and 
scanning devices fastened to doors  (to monitor entrances and exits from 
classrooms). Doors can be programmed to allow access for certain people at 
certain times, and to deny it at others (Doncaster Today, 18th October 2007).
Library Management and Cashless Catering 
The most ostensibly innocuous surveillance systems in schools are arguably 
fingerprint scanning technologies for issuing books from school libraries, and/or 
7enabling cashless catering at lunchtimes and breaks (which will be the main 
focus of this article below) (The Guardian, 30th March 2006).  Some schools 
have claimed that this is no different from giving children individualized 
passwords to access computers, although this seems not to grasp that all 
biometric information is more personal and intimate than a password. They are 
usually introduced on efficiency grounds - smartcards may so easily be lost - but 
parents have sometimes found them controversial and the ICO has commented 
on them. Cashless catering can segue into the monitoring of pupils’ eating 
habits. At least one school extended cashless catering to promote healthy 
eating by recording on the same computer pupils’ choices of food and awarding 
points and eventually prizes to those who made the healthiest choices. More 
recently, Todholm Primary School, Renfrewshire has developed this further, 
using ‘a system based on the infrared light detection of vein patterns on pupils’ 
hands’, which tells catering staff if a child has any food allergies, and informs 
parents on what their children are eating (Renfrew Council 2009).
Crime Prevention 
Some school surveillance takes place to monitor drug use – using periodic, 
unannounced visits by sniffer dogs - and is operated in conjunction with local 
police forces; in England these do tend to have the support of parents (The
Guardian,21st April 2005). Metal detector ‘search arches’ of the kind used in 
airports (and some railway stations) have been set up in some English schools 
to deter knife carrying. Children are not required to empty their pockets before 
they pass through the search arches, which represents a limited form of privacy 
protection - but to avoid allegations of discrimination, all pupils rather than just 
‘suspect categories’ of pupil, are periodically required to pass through them. The 
Observer (20th January 2008) noted ‘teachers unions have welcomed them 
because of the dangers caused by manually frisking pupils’. 
Assessment and Examination 
John Gilliom (2010) provocatively suggests that the ancient, core school tasks 
of assessment and testing can be illuminated via the lens of surveillance theory, 
and new technologies do make this possible in a variety of ways. Anti-plagiarism 
software (which compares a pupil’s submitted written work with online 
databases) is increasingly being used to scan essays, literally monitoring the 
words used. More mundanely, perhaps, the (English) Examination Officers 
Association may use CCTV and fingerprint scanners in some of its centres to 
deter and detect cheating (e.g. proxy candidates being sent, pens fitted with 
voice recorders), and to protect invigilators from complaints from pupils – which 
are apparently rising (The Daily Telegraph, 12th April 2008).
Catchment Control 
Dorset County Council has used the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) 2000 (enacted to deal with serious crimes and terrorism) to ascertain 
whether or not families who had applied to send their children to particular 
schools were in fact living in the catchment area. The council used covert 
physical surveillance, arguing that this protected the rights of genuinely local 
8parents. Alarmingly, the Home Office did not object to this (The Guardian, 11th
April 2008). 
Certain elements recur in the above news stories (which are detailed more 
fully in Nellis et al. 2008). Firstly, specific incidents of harm to pupils (including 
murder), coupled with the fear of further incidents, have clearly played a part in 
triggering or consolidating the use of visual surveillance, electronic registration 
and search arches. Secondly, in a number of instances it is clear that 
commercial organisations are actively promoting these technologies and/or 
working in partnership with schools, and the role of such organizations certainly 
warrants greater scrutiny. Writing in an American context, Monahan (2006) sees 
the growth of surveillance in schools as an expression, in microcosm, of a 
distinctly “neoliberal” approach to the creation of social order, a position also 
taken (but critiqued) in Cory Doctorow’s (2008) California-set school 
surveillance novel, Little Brother.  In Britain it is true that  “efficiency” vies with 
“security” as the main stated rationale for their introduction but whether these 
are the real “causes” of the new developments, or merely discourses which 
legitimate them, is unclear. Empirical research into the development of 
surveillance practices in schools, the meanings they have to those involved with 
them and the consequences (intended and unintended) they have for the life of 
the institution would need to be undertaken before they could be theorised with 
confidence, given the divergent trajectories of recent surveillance theory (Lyon 
2006). As the text which heads this paper reminds us, however, the shadow of 
Michel Foucault’s prescient critique of discipline, biopower and panopticism falls 
still across all contemporary surveillance practices (Monahan & Torres 2010). 
While it is indeed not difficult to anticipate dangers posed by these technologies 
– our vignette deliberately plays into them – we cannot rule out the occurrence 
of benign or indifferent consequences, the advent of viable ethical and legal 
constraints or even the emergence of resistance by teachers and pupils, or 
both. While we believe that making surveillance in schools “a case for 
curriculum” will offset some of the dangers posed, by sensitising teachers and 
pupils alike to the issues involved, we are also, like Hope (2009: 903), mindful of 
the “possible moral cost” of allowing these technologies to become embedded 
without adequate reflection, beyond the point at which danger can be averted. 
The following brief analysis of a recent consultation exercise in Scotland on 
biometrics will shed some light on the emerging issues.  
THE SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT CONSULTATION PAPER 
The Scottish Government issued its consultation paper on biometrics in schools 
in September 2008 (see Scottish Government 2008). Drafted by the Schools 
Directorate, it tapped expertise from three sources: the pre-existing Principles 
Expert Group2, established the same month to advise more generally on the 
2
 The Principles Expert Group was established to undertake a review of identity management and 
privacy principles. It met between October 2008 and March 2009, and its report (Scottish 
Government 2009c) went out to consultation between 1st September and 23
rd
 November 2009. 
The members were Jerry Fishenden, Lead Technology Adviser,  Microsoft UK;  Gus Hosein, 
Privacy International; Rosemary Jay, partner at Pinsent Mason LLP; Alan Kirkwood, chair of 
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public services in an era of e-government; the British Educational 
Communications and Technology Agency (BECTA), which advises schools on 
all aspects of ICT implementation); and the Information Commissioner’s Office3,
which had already concluded, for example, that biometric technologies in 
schools were not illegal, even when introduced without parental consultation.  
The very fact that guidance on biometrics was thought necessary by the 
Scottish Government is itself a sign of changing times.  The paper recognized 
that some Scottish schools are already using, or contemplating the use of, 
biometric systems to register and verify the identity of pupils in a number of 
settings4. Cashless catering systems, automated registration of pupils’ arrival in 
school and school library automation were the three mentioned, but potentially 
there are others, as the above overview indicates. The government’s focus 
seemed to be on fingerprints and palmprints (which work as identifiers because 
of unique vein patterns in the hands), but as their guidelines acknowledged, the 
debate in future may encompass iris prints, voiceprints and facial recognition 
systems, which are already used in non-educational settings.  
Contemporary biometrics – literally, the measurement of the body – entails 
the use of technologies to authenticate individual identity, by integrating unique 
data gathered from peoples’ bodies into electronic systems and databases. This 
data can then be used to authorize access to places and services, at borders or 
in organizations – and in the case of DNA (the most publicized of biometrics), to 
identify, incriminate or exonerate (Zureik & Hindle 2004). As an aspect of 
surveillance, biometrics are increasing in prominence: ‘in a world of identity 
politics and risk management, surveillance is turning decisively to the body as a 
document for identification, and as a means of prediction’ (Lyon 2001: 72). Irma 
van der Ploeg, (1999; 2003) sees the ‘informatisation of the body’- the 
translation of physical qualities into digital code - as something which may 
eventually enlarge our sense of what our bodies are for, as machine-readable 
objects which can place and trace us. As noted above, commercial 
organizations have sensed (and perhaps created) a market here, promoting the 
view that biometric technology is constantly improving, although as Lyon (2009) 
points out, evidence of biometrics’ decisive value in achieving stated 
organizational goals is very variable. Given biometrics’ expansion in the wider 
world, it was perhaps inevitable that schools would eventually be affected by 
these developments, for better or worse, as the Scottish Government’s 
consultation now confirms.  
A number of initial observations about the consultation paper might usefully 
be made. Whilst, as noted, research in this area remains limited, schools are 
SocITM Scotland; Ken MacDonald, Assistant Information Commissioner for  Scotland; Duncan 
McNiven, Registrar General for Scotland and Charles Raab, Professor Emeritus and Honorary 
Fellow, University of Edinburgh. (Scottish Government, News Release 31
st
 August 2009).        
3
 The Information Commissioner’s Office is the UK-wide regulatory body for the Data Protection 
Act 1998.  Its guidance on fingerprints in schools can be found at www.ico.gov.uk. BECTA’s  
material is available at http://industry.becta.org.uk/
4
 The guidance  (para 8.2) implies that the Schools (Health Promotion and Nutrition) (Scotland) 
Act 2007 has given schools an incentive to adopt biometrics in respect of catering arrangements.   
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showing an interest in biometric systems (and perhaps surveillance systems 
more generally) ostensibly because of  concerns about efficiency (switching to 
time-saving systems which don’t require pupils to carry smart cards, which may 
easily be lost), security (creating safe learning environments by restricting or 
denying access to unapproved/unregistered people) and accountability (in 
respect of school attendance and the prevention of harm to pupils). These 
concerns are widespread in contemporary society, and biometric solutions to 
them are only one among several surveillance technologies that have been, or 
are being, developed to address them. The draft guidance did not in fact use the 
word ‘surveillance’ to describe biometric technologies. This may have reflected 
the sense that, as noted earlier, the term ‘surveillance” is so freighted with 
negative connotations that it may impede a fair appraisal of measures which 
may well be benign and constructive.  Nonetheless, for three reasons, the term 
should be used in the context of the biometrics debate generally, and in respect 
of the consultation document in particular, specifically: 
i) The Information Commissioner’s Office, on whose views the guidance  built, 
openly uses the term ‘surveillance’ and has invited open debate on what it 
means to live in a ‘surveillance society’ in which people’s behaviour is 
monitored, for good or ill, far more extensively than in the past. This debate is 
both valuable in itself, and an important backcloth to any debate on the 
introduction of biometric technologies in schools. 
ii) The draft guidance rightly emphasised the importance of consultation with 
parents and pupils, and it is unlikely that in any dialogue between schools and 
parents the broader question of surveillance would not be raised, however 
inchoately. By not using the ‘S-word’, the guidance looks as though it is avoiding 
the obvious, which may seem suspicious to people whose sensibilities may 
already have registered, however simplistically, the state’s capacity to surveil 
them.
iii) Acknowledging the general term ‘surveillance’ highlights the fact that 
biometrics are only one technology among several that can (at least in principle)
be used to increase safety, security and accountability in the world at large and 
in schools in particular - CCTV, webcams, RFID chips, searchable databases, 
metal detectors, plagiarism-detecting software, and so forth.  It seems important 
to acknowledge the broader context into which school biometrics may be 
introduced, and that in the course of consultations with parents and pupils, such 
technologies are not discussed as if they operate in isolation.       
The actual uses of biometric systems in Scottish schools - as far as they can 
be ascertained - have a tentative and experimental feel about them. They seem 
not to be extensively used - a Sunday Herald  (October 7th 2007) survey 
indicated that 14 of the 32 Scottish authorities were using biometrics (although 
not in every school) - a Paisley primary school having been the first, in 2006. 
Interest in the potential of biometrics in schools is probably being shown, as it is 
in wider society, for the reasons given above - they seemingly offer solutions to 
perceived problems of efficiency, security and accountability. There are 
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increasing numbers of commercial organizations which market their products in 
these terms5. To some extent they are exploiting fear and anxiety about staff 
and pupil safety, as well as a latent desire to be modern and technocratic - but 
there is no doubt, at root, that these concerns are sometimes felt keenly in 
schools themselves, and that technical solutions are being sought (Lloyd & 
Ching 2003).
INTERPRETING THE DRAFT GUIDANCE 
In tone, discursively, the draft guidance was in fact tilted towards discouraging
local education authorities from adopting biometric technologies, implying that 
they were probably not a good thing. It questioned the proportionality of such 
systems – were they really necessary, were there alternatives? (para 8:1) – and 
suggested that  biometric solutions to the problem of identifying pupils in receipt 
of free school meals in non-stigmatising ways  ‘probably cannot be justified  
purely  as a  response’ to recent Scottish legislation on school nutrition. 
Furthermore, it said, designing opt-out systems for pupils and parents who did 
not wish to enrol in biometric systems (para 8.1), would be administratively 
cumbersome.  
Recognising nonetheless that Scottish schools may well adopt biometric 
technology regardless, the guidance identified issues that warranted attention. 
In respect of security, they insisted that biometric data must be encrypted, that 
access to it would be limited to authorised personnel and that it would be 
destroyed when the pupil left the school. It is indeed essential that school-based 
biometrics are self-contained within a given school, not only that they are not 
“hackable” but also that they are not “interoperable”, i.e. deliberately linked to 
other computerised databases which can be accessed by a range of agencies. 
Their legitimacy in the eyes of most stakeholders depends on their being secure 
in themselves, and their data unsharable. Public confidence in the security of 
data held by government and corporations has been dented by large scale 
losses of personal data (by accident, human error or crime) such that, in respect 
of schools, regular (annual?) reviews of technical and administrative systems 
should be undertaken to ensure that they have not become vulnerable to abuse.  
In respect of legislation, the guidance wisely insisted that while no prevailing 
legislation required parental or pupil consent to the introduction of biometric 
measures, consultation with parents should always be undertaken (paras 9.1.2, 
and 4). Worryingly however, it said nothing about requiring consultation with 
teaching staff or support staff on the introduction of biometric systems, not least 
in respect of the workload and training implications, implying that this was 
5
 The number of commercial organisations involved in making surveillance technologies for the 
schools market, and related markets, can only be guessed at.  Most CCTV manufacturers can 
supply schools, but Classwatch, which (according to its brochure) “provides clear real-time, high-
quality digital and audio recording with unobtrusive vandal-proof cameras and secure recorders 
with removable hard drive”, caters specifically to them. Some identity verification companies, like 
Biostore Ltd, are subsidiaries of larger organisations, while others are created specifically:  
Darnbro was set up (by former teachers) in England to patent and pilot the RFID tracking in 
Doncaster schools.   
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perhaps a decision for senior school managers only, and that other staff’s 
consent does not matter. Even in respect of parental consent, the issue was 
fudged. The guidance did not explicitly say that schools MUST seek informed 
consent from parents, although in allowing non-consenting pupils and parents to 
opt-out, it  at least implied that consent must be given. Even paragraph 9.4, 
emphatic as it was, left ambiguous the relationship between consultation (which 
is required) and consent (which is not, at least legally).  
The draft guidance did not give sufficient attention to relevant differences in 
introducing biometric systems in primary and secondary schools, and to their 
implications for the primary/secondary interface. Small rural primary schools 
may not find it particularly attractive to go down the biometric route, even for 
efficiency reasons.  In such relatively intimate communities, face-to-face 
knowledge makes it fairly easy to keep track of pupil attendance, library loans 
and individualised catering arrangements. (At the same time, some automated 
surveillance systems make possible a welcome anonymity, and reduced stigma, 
in intimate communities where perhaps too much is potentially, and 
unavoidably, known about individual members). In addition, liaisons between 
primary and secondary schools vary in their complexity, ranging from a small 
number of primaries being associated with a local secondary, to very large 
numbers of primaries having, in practice, no linkages (other than the 
transmission of some paperwork) with a distant popular secondary. It will need 
to be assumed that databases generated by biometric identification and 
allocation systems should be treated as separate and discreet entities, and play 
no part in the primary/secondary transition. To a degree, this runs counter to the 
prevailing (and still deepening) ethos of interoperability/data sharing in the 
interests of children’s welfare, as in England’s ContactPoint6 system: schools 
will have to reconcile these dissonant mentalities.  
Quite apart from the question of where, and with whom, back-up biometric 
data might be stored, the sharing of such data in some contexts may in fact be 
unavoidable. Partnerships between secondary schools and further education 
colleges (increasing as more Skills for Work courses come on-stream – see 
HMIe 2009) raise the problem of institutional identity and affiliation: pupils may 
pursue their education in a complex network of linked but spatially separate 
institutions, rather than a single school campus.  In practice, it would seem that 
each component of the partnership would need common systems for appraising 
biometric identifiers. This would probably make the management and 
safeguarding tasks referred to above more complex still.     
6
 ContactPoint - launched in England in 2009 at a cost of £224m, as a response to several child 
protection scandals - is a nationwide database accessible by authorised public sector personnel to 
add and gather information which, it is officially claimed, will help them to support and safeguard 
children. It has been criticised by privacy advocates for its surveillance dimensions, and by Overtis 
Systems, a computer security firm, for its vulnerability to viruses and spyware (Daily Telegraph 3
rd
August 2009).      
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SCHOOLS AND THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 
The ICO’s (2006) Report on The Surveillance Society (launched in Scotland in 
2007) is somewhat weaker in its analysis of how surveillance might impact in 
schools in 2017 than in any other area of social life, whether the workplace, the 
shopping mall, transport systems, or criminal justice institutions. It also says 
nothing about the place or function of schools in surveillance society. Whatever 
the merit of speculative extrapolations (as in the vignette at the start of this 
article), the ICO is nonetheless clear that  the  surveillance society is here now; 
it is not something that yet awaits us, although surveillance in the future may 
well extend, mutate and intensify to meet shifting perceptions of, or demands 
for, convenience, security and accountability. Schools arguably have a 
responsibility to prepare and educate pupils about life in the surveillance 
society.  There seem to be two emerging views as to how schools might do this, 
which are in some tension with each other:  
i) As schools themselves become more surveilled environments, some privacy 
activists fear that they will habituate pupils into accepting the forms of 
surveillance they will encounter in workplaces and public space as adults, 
indeed which they already encounter as young people outside school. Schools, 
in this view, will prepare pupils for the surveillance society, but in an uncritical 
way, simply by normalising surveillance within its own structures and 
administrative processes. One solution - which the draft guidance seemingly 
tilted towards - is to stop schools becoming surveilled environments, 
presumably as part of a more general attempt to roll-back the presence of 
surveillance technologies in other areas of life. This “traditionally liberal” position 
may, given the pervasiveness of broader surveillance developments, be 
Canute-like.  
ii) Schools should prepare pupils for the surveillance society by critically 
engaging pupils with its realities and prospects. This seems to be the implied 
position of the ICO and several academic commentators on surveillance. It is 
premised on a belief that, through informed understanding, the worst excesses 
of the over-surveilled society may yet be avoided; but also on a recognition that 
we are already immersed in a web of surveillance, that we find it useful or 
innocuous, that it will not easily be rolled-back and that what liberty, autonomy 
and privacy mean in this new world must be worked out anew. Some pupils will 
doubtless work this out by resistance (Doctorow 2008; Weiss 2010; Hope 2010), 
but this cannot be left to chance. Schools themselves must turn surveillance-in-
schools into a pedagogical issue, not just a technical, administrative or 
management issue, as part of a wider curricular strategy for educating pupils 
about the changed environment in which they are growing up.  
The prospective introduction of biometric surveillance technologies  - or 
indeed any surveillance technologies  - into a school does need to be effectively 
addressed as an administrative task (the focus of the draft guidance), and as an 
aspect of “workplace surveillance”, which affects teachers themselves, but it 
also provides a pretext for more explicitly educational discussions with pupils 
(secondary pupils, at least), and indeed with parents. The draft guidance did not 
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cover “workplace” or “educational” concerns, and while it may not have been 
thought appropriate to raise pedagogical issues, it could usefully have outlined 
the intellectual/educational issues that warrant exploration in consultation, 
above and beyond the merely technical and administrative issues. It is possible 
that unless teachers themselves take the “surveilled workplace” issue seriously, 
the subject will not be prioritised with pupils; equally, it may enter the curricula of 
some schools regardless of whether teachers (and their unions) address it 
systematically.
Consultation with parents should always entail more than a letter to the 
home. Inadequate literacy among some parents, and the technical nature of 
biometrics, makes full understanding unlikely from merely written notification. 
Only in a face-to-face dialogue with teachers and the anticipated administrators 
of the new system, where parents can test the technology, is the level of 
understanding necessary for truly informed consent - a consciously articulated 
“yes”  - likely to be generated.
Consultation with pupils, especially primary school pupils, will require careful 
thought. In eliciting responses from young people, it will probably be difficult with 
this topic for schools to distinguish between naiveté (which is likely to mean that 
pupils will regard biometric technologies as ‘cool’ and futuristic, and be 
uncritically enthusiastic about them), and immaturity (which means they do not 
have the life experience to make good judgements of the pros and cons). 
Perhaps the only way to alleviate this is to address surveillance in the 
curriculum.    
It would not be difficult to address biometrics and, more sensibly, the 
surveillance society in general within the secondary school curriculum. Alert, 
enterprising teachers may already be doing this  – this is something else we do 
not know.  The very nature of the topic certainly makes it amenable to curricular 
inserts and cross-curricular approaches. Both would afford study in the sciences 
and technology, in social subjects/modern studies, in literature and media 
studies, and in social education. This, above and beyond consultation with 
pupils about the introduction of specific biometric systems within their particular 
school, would help prepare them - critically, one hopes - for life in the 
surveillance society. In the Scottish context, the incoming (2010) Curriculum for 
Excellence guidelines in the area of Technologies would permit the inclusion of 
material on biometrics (Pupils should ‘develop an understanding of the role and 
impact of technologies in changing and influencing societies’;...; they should 
‘become an informed consumer and producer who has an appreciation of the 
merits and impacts of products  and services…’  (see LTS 2009). 
PRIVACY, PROPORTIONALITY AND INTRUSIVENESS 
Biometrics raise important new questions about privacy and bodily integrity, 
some common to all surveillance technologies, some distinct. In settings where 
different sorts of technology can operate simultaneously, interact with each 
other and perhaps generate aggregated data, it is arguably limiting to discuss 
biometric technologies in isolation, particularly in respect of privacy impact 
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assessments7. Any such assessment that failed to explore all  forms of 
surveillance technology operating, or anticipated, in a given school  would be 
incomplete, and would say little, in human or institutional terms, about the 
privacy issues that were actually at stake. Pupils, after all, experience school as 
a total environment, not in separate administrative segments, and it is surely 
preferable to heighten their consciousness of being ‘data subjects’8 in the round, 
not just in relation to particular technical systems.  
Concerns about proportionality and intrusiveness were rightly central to the 
draft guidelines, and were seemingly part of what tilted the government against 
biometrics, but they need to be explored in relation to changing sensibilities. 
What people experience as proportional and intrusive can alter within and 
across generations, and while that does not obviate a need for setting 
standards, attention to people’s - including children’s - actual subjectivity in 
respect of surveillance matters if we are to treat them fairly, and if we are to 
recognize the benefits which benign technologies might offer. Objectively, it 
might well be argued that biometrics are simply not a proportionate response to 
mere problems of efficiency in a school when other solutions are available. 
Whether they are felt by users to be disproportionate is, however, another 
matter; they may, for better or worse, be sensed as nothing more than 
innocuous ‘functional equivalents of other forms of informal controls that 
[previously] operated’ (Feeley 2003: 118). Following Aas (2004) and Parton 
(2008), a more critical analysis may well suggest that biometrics in general 
exemplify a broader, potentially dehumanizing, shift from “social” to 
“informational” ways of authoritative knowing, from reliance on rich “narrative 
accounts” about people to shallow “database profiles” - but subject populations’ 
own vocabularies for understanding this transition still need to be grasped, all 
the more so if they have little inkling of its significance for their lives.   
To many contemporary adults, biometrics - especially fingerprinting - has 
indelible associations with policing and criminal justice, and, nowadays, border 
control.  They have ‘connotations’ of suspicion, incrimination and exclusion 
which one would not sensibly wish to see carried over into school settings, 
where their very presence may well engender feelings, not of reassurance, but 
of insecurity and paranoia. To younger people – whose engagement with social 
networking sites such as Facebook suggests a more attenuated commitment to 
informational privacy than their parents had (Boyd 2008) – they may not seem 
quite so stigmatizing. In any case, as van der Ploeg (2003: 60) argues, the 
7
 Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), often seen by organisations as a means of “risk 
management”, but just as important for civil liberties, are becoming the tool of choice to assess 
surveilled environments. An online handbook describing how to construct and conduct them is 
available from the ICO, and they are now strongly encouraged by the Scottish Government 
(2009b). For a broad and accessible discussion of contemporary privacy issues, see O’Hara & 
Shadbolt (2008).    
8
 Examining what it means to be a “surveilled subject” entails understanding both an individual’s 
subjective experience of surveillance, and also the way which profiles about him/her  (variously 
called “data doubles” or “digital selves”) can be built up on databases, retained for years despite 
inaccuracies, and used to affect decisions about them – minor or major - perhaps without their 
knowing (see Lyon 2001; 2007; 2009).    
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‘exclusive association [of fingerprinting] with criminality is rapidly becoming 
obsolete’, and biometric identity verification is now being used to confirm status 
and privilege ‘for the respectable client, the cardholder or club member’- fast-
tracking them through airports, for example, or facilitating entry to, and mobility 
around, Disneyworld, Florida.  If, as a result of their normalization in the wider 
world, biometrics come to be seen in more mundane and/or more positive 
terms, the question of their proportionality and intrusiveness in school settings 
may well be revised.  
Echoing van der Ploeg (2003), the Scottish Government (2008: para 4.2) 
stated openly that “biometric systems can be perceived as more intrusive than 
other systems”. True enough: they use parts of the body as personal identifiers, 
in a way that other access and registration systems do not. The ‘bodyparts’ in 
question, however, are minute and complex patterns on skin and in vein 
systems of which their ‘owners’ themselves may barely be aware, and which are 
(probably) not integral to people’s subjective identities or sense of uniqueness. 
Using technology to make these patterns ‘visible’ and ‘machine-readable’ at 
selected service-access points is arguably less threatening to privacy and 
dignity than, say, scanning systems which reveal the naked body (now used in 
some airports), or manual searches which require “frisking”. Not all surveillance 
systems “intrude” in the same way, or to the same degree; biometric systems 
are not “panoptic” in any literal sense, but in the way that they can sort and code 
individuals at access points, they can isolate and exclude in a way that systems 
which “merely watch” cannot. Cashless catering systems can be adapted to 
identify pupils in receipt of free school meals without the potential 
embarrassment entailed by showing a special card or saying aloud that they are 
such recipients. In that sense an automated biometric scanning system may be 
experienced as less stigmatising than the gaze of another human being. In the 
longer term, however, the routine use of our body as a “password” (Lyon 2009: 
113) may well add subtle new dimensions to our experience of embodiment and 
sense of self, particularly if digitized body data is used to enforce the spatial 
exclusion or denial of significant services to vulnerable people, in ways 
unimaginable to present generations.      
For now, the question of whether pupils experience biometrics in school as 
intrusive is partly a question (for better or worse) of what they might over time 
get used to, of the meanings they bring to the experience of being scanned and 
the perceived losses and gains entailed - as against the alternatives. Some 
pupils, particularly those of secondary age, are used to electronic gadgets in 
their lives, and may perceive certain aspects of surveillance as ‘cool’ (much 
media representation treats it thus) - but little is known about their actual 
responses to these emerging new realities. Above all, at the present time, both 
pupils’ and parents’ perspectives on biometrics is – as Hope (2009) suggests in 
relation to school CCTV systems – a question for research because, without it, it 
is difficult to know which theoretical tack to take, what level of anxiety to muster. 
It is difficult, for example, to envisage how meaningful privacy impact 
assessments could be undertaken in this area without research-based data on 
the kinds of privacy people care about, and the trade-offs that, rightly or 
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wrongly, they may be willing to make for the sake of security, or just to have 
more electronically “connected” lives (O’Hara & Shadbolt 2008).    
THE RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION  
The Scottish Government received 23 responses to the draft guidelines, 
publishing them on their website on 7th January 2009. There were 13 from local 
councils; 2 from teacher associations; 1 from a parent-teacher association; 1 
from a primary school, and 1 from NO2ID (a pressure group opposed to the 
expansion of surveillance). In addition, there were responses from Biostore Ltd 
(which manufactures biometric technology), the ICO; and Clydebank Women’s 
Aid, as well as our own response from the University of Strathclyde. One 
individual citizen made a private submission. What follows is not a 
comprehensive review of the responses – which can be found at Scottish 
Government 2009a – but a selection of key points that support or extend the 
same debate that we ourselves wish to stimulate. The Scottish Government 
(2009b) in fact issued its own analysis of the responses in February 2009; our 
emphases are somewhat different from theirs.  
The responses from the councils were wide-ranging in content and format, 
the majority simply commenting on the perceived clarity or otherwise of the draft 
guidelines. Glasgow and Inverclyde seemed to take pride in saying that they did 
not use biometric technologies and had no plans to do so, whilst commending 
the clarity of the guidance   in the event of ever needing them. Overall, the 
guidance was seen as flagging up the right issues and as being fair-minded, but 
several agreed that the omission of advice on how to handle the media (who 
were perceived as unduly interested in surveillance in schools) needed to be 
rectified. Concerns about data security were legion, and some councils 
recognized the roles that schools might inadvertently play in acclimatizing young 
people to the surveillance society. Those using biometric systems, e.g. 
Renfrewshire, did not report difficulties with families who opted out.  Several 
councils reported using other registration and authentication systems that did 
not rely on biometrics, Highland Council, for example, linking theirs to the roll 
out of the National Entitlement Card9. Edinburgh City Council questioned the 
wisdom (and cost) of biometric systems not being interoperable, and linked to 
existing “school management information systems”, while the board of Wester 
Cleddens Primary School stated that it was “vehemently opposed” to  the 
introduction of any “Orwellian” biometric technology in school. 
The Educational Institute of Scotland took a sombre view of the prospect, 
doubting their necessity as a means of making schools safer or more efficient, 
9
 The National Entitlement Card (NEC) is an electronic smartcard available for 11-26 year olds in 
Scotland, which enables them to give proof of age and to access a range of services, including 
travel and library/leisure membership, sometimes at a discount. The intended linking of the NEC 
to school-based identity verification systems shows clearly how debates on biometrics in schools 
mirror broader debates on identity authentication in wider society, in particular ID cards (see Lyon 
2009). In 2006 the then Scottish Executive considered incorporating Scottish Candidate Numbers, 
which had hitherto been  given only to secondary school pupils in the third year and above, as part 
of electronic registration systems in schools (Glasgow Evening Times 23
rd
 February 2006).  
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and fearing that if the technologies were applied to the pupils they would sooner 
or later be applied to the workforce as well, “to record timekeeping, attendance 
and other behaviours”. It opposed this. The Scottish Secondary Teachers’ 
Association anticipated simple practical problems: “There would be a potentially 
serious problem with overcrowding if every pupil in a large secondary school 
had to record their palm or fingerprint at one of a small number of machines 
every day” – delay at the scanners would give some pupils the perfect excuse 
for late attendance. Perth and Kinross Council echoed this point, noting also 
that scanning protocols “in emergency situations such as building evacuations 
[are] not addressed”. The Scottish Parent Teacher Council accepted that 
biometric systems could be made secure, insisting that “it is important not to 
overstate the dangers of using biometric systems”.     
Clydebank Women’s Aid worried about the “containment of information” on 
the databases associated with electronic/biometric registration systems, 
suggesting furthermore that inclusion on them sometimes accentuated domestic 
violence victims’ pervasive sense of vulnerability, of being at the mercy of a 
“totality of power”. Responding simply as an individual, Jackie Marshall, a 
mother, opposed  the introduction of biometric surveillance technologies into 
schools because of the climate of mistrust and suspicion she felt they created, 
plus  the difficulties that would exist (in terms of stigma  and inconvenience) for 
any child or parent who opted out of such schemes. She then made a novel 
point:   
I have a thirteen year old daughter who is learning to handle money and the last 
thing I wish to do as a parent is to engender a culture of mistrust on how she 
chose to spend her lunch money. The State should not be trying to undermine 
parental responsibility and I believe this policy, should it be successful, will do 
just that. ….. What are we saying to our young people when we are scanning 
their palms, fingerprints and not trusting them to handle money?   
Many of the responses, NO2ID’s most emphatically, questioned the easy 
reassurance in the draft guidance that school-based biometric technologies 
were not interoperable and wanted more safeguards. As if in anticipation of this 
reaction, Biostore Ltd’s response emphasized the security, reliability and 
versatility of the various technologies that were already being used in schools, 
and those which might be used in the future. The company has been in 
existence for 2 years  - it was a subsidiary of Softlink Europe Ltd – to provide 
“authentication software” for the schools market. Its emergence was premised 
on “a rapid and understandable trend towards integration of identification across 
a range of applications, allowing vital information to be available instantly across 
a number of databases, without the need for rekeying of data, or ‘manual’ 
transfer of files”. It acknowledged that “in this fast moving sector, technology is 
advancing quickly, and for the next few years is likely to be implemented well in 
advance of up-to-date guidelines being laid down by any governing authority”.  It 
claimed to have “product…. in use in over 600 schools throughout the UK”, 
indicating its openness to  using biometrics alongside other forms of identify 
authentication – smartcards, barcodes, PINs and passwords  - in a range of 
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applications, library management, cashless catering, access control, print and 
copy management, computer log-on [and] lesson registration.”      
CONCLUSIONS  
Surveillance practices, in a variety of forms and for a range of reasons, are 
becoming a more commonplace feature of schools in Scotland and elsewhere. 
The precise reasons why this is occurring are improperly understood, and 
warrant research, both national and comparative, in order to theorise their full 
social and political complexity. The Scottish Government’s publication of 
guidance on the introduction of biometric technologies in Scottish schools, and 
the subsequent consultation, created a useful opportunity to examine one small 
aspect of these developments, but more comprehensive investigations are 
needed, which look at the combined impact of multiple surveillance technologies 
in schools, and theorise  them in the context of the emerging “surveillance 
society”.  
In September 2008, the Scottish Government’s draft guidance seemingly 
recognised the pressures on schools  - centred on improving the security and 
safety of children and staff and the need for ever more efficient administrative 
systems - to see surveillance technologies as credible means of addressing real 
and anticipated difficulties. In a risk-averse, cost-conscious culture, schools may 
well be accused of not doing enough to improve safety and efficiency if available 
technologies are not adopted - although in the coming age of public sector 
austerity even the start-up costs of biometric systems may be prohibitive. Final 
guidance will not be issued until after the completion of the Scottish 
Government’s (2009c) consultation on identity management in the public sector 
more generally (in November 2009)10, and it remains to be seen if the 
Government’s position on biometrics remains as it was in the original draft 
guidance. The new consultation document makes only brief mention of 
biometrics, but is very strong on consultation with affected parties, and indeed, 
public and professional education about the underlying technical and ethical 
issues.       
The draft guidance arguably underplayed the potentially positive aspects of 
biometrics as enhancers of convenience (ease of access at checkpoints) and 
justice  (eliminating the stigma of welfare recipients). The public association of 
biometrics with policing and border controls may well crumble as more 
innocuous uses of them develop in the wider world; the lingering suspicion that 
they are  inherently  disproportionate and intrusive for use in schools  may  (for 
better or worse) dissipate. The guidance unhelpfully fudged issues of 
10
 At the time of the final revisions to this paper (February 2010) the Scottish Government was 
planning to issue final guidance on biometrics in schools – informed by the consultation on identity 
management and privacy - in March 2010. (Personal communication, Laura Miekle, Scottish 
Government, 1st February 2010.)  
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consultation and consent in respect of parents, pupils and teachers, in ways that 
would curtail rather than encourage necessary dialogue. It was somewhat 
complacent in respect of data security. Alongside privacy impact statements, 
regular technology reviews are essential, to demonstrate and signal to others 
that systems remain secure over time - or not – and to ensure their continued 
legitimacy in the eyes of various stakeholders. 
The crucial issue – overlooked in the initial guidance  – is that schools must 
prepare pupils for life in the newly emergent  ‘surveillance society’, not by 
uncritically habituating them to surveillance systems used in schools, but by 
critically engaging them in thought about the way surveillance technologies work 
in the wider world, the various rationales given to them, and the implications  - in 
terms of privacy, accountability, safety and inclusion - of being a ‘surveilled 
subject’. The introduction of biometric identification systems  - or any 
surveillance system  - in schools creates a pretext for this, but a far wider range 
of issues could - and should - be addressed in the curriculum. The subtitle to 
this article was in the form of a question – Is biometric surveillance in schools a 
‘cause for concern or case for curriculum?’  Our answer is most certainly: ‘Both’.  
And, it is interesting that Biostore Ltd, in its submission to the consultation, 
came close to endorsing this view:   
It is vital that questions about the management of identity take on a high profile 
within education, as data loss and identify theft becomes more significant in this 
age of vast databases and an excess of stored information. Students need to be 
very aware of how their data can be compromised. Issues to be discussed must 
range from revealing personal data on social networking sites, to protecting how 
biometrics are recorded and used.   
This is a welcome admission, attuned to contemporary realities, but – despite 
our agnosticism about the precise theoretical tack to take in this paper – it 
arguably does not go far enough. The near future of surveillance in British 
schools may not resemble those of their US counterparts (Monahan & Torres 
2010) or be as grim as novelist Cory Doctorow (2008) envisages in Little
Brother. The results of future research, and the depiction and dissemination of 
dystopian futures now (like the vignette with which we began) may well work to 
make such futures less likely.  Nonetheless, the very existence of Biostore Ltd, 
and organisations like it, signal the quiet and unexamined emergence of a 
market in school surveillance technology, and while this alone does not warrant 
a necessarily sinister interpretation of all surveillance-in-school developments it 
undoubtedly justifies the close analytical attention to the issues which we have 
provided in this paper.  
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